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Chapter 2 
Law, Language and Multilingualism in Europe: The Call for a New Legal Culture*
Michele Graziadei
Introduction
The unique linguistic regime in which European law operates constitutes part of the complex
system of lawmaking established by the European Treaties. Until recent years, the problems and
opportunities arising within the framework of the EU linguistic regime were not high on the
agenda of mainstream scholarly research. Brilliant forward-looking efforts, such as those to map
the development of a new European legal culture, still ignored the challenges and consequences
of the choice to frame the law in a plurality of languages across the European space. 1 This
situation  is  changing.  The  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  (CJEU)  is  regularly
confronted with the problem of how to deal with discrepancies among the various language
versions of EU legislation. Abundant specialist literature exists on the drafting, interpretation
and application of multilingual EU law in the 24 official languages of the European Union, as
well as on the challenging translation issues connected to this dynamic. This chapter therefore
does not intend to discuss that linguistic regime and the institutional arrangements making it
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 Scholars who disagree in other respects share at least this observation; see, for example, Kjær (2008: 150) and
Glanaert (2012: 137). 
possible, nor does it comment on the state of the art in the related field of translation studies
concerning EU law.2
The purpose of this chapter is rather to address a point not fully elucidated so far, that
is, how the culture of the community of lawyers involved in the application of European law in
the Member States is changing as a result of efforts to cope with the multilingual dimension of
EU law.
My argument is that there is still a tendency in Europe to succumb to general ideas
about the relationship between language and the law that obscure the complex nature of the
process leading to the application of legal rules. Multilingual legislation displaces theories about
the relationship between law and language which rely on those ideas by pushing both lawyers
and  linguists  to  understand  how  (and  under  which  conditions)  normative  texts  drafted  in
different  languages can result  in  convergent  interpretative practices.  Multilingual  legislation
thus opens the way to an understanding of law that  invites  less  unthinking reliance on the
normative  virtues  of  texts  as  such,  placing  more  attention  on  the  normative  forces  and
communicative practices underlying the development of the law across Europe.
Many Languages for a Single Voice
EU citizens can expect to be bound by European legislation available in at least one of their
languages. This expectation is based on, if not protected3 by the current EU linguistic regime
establishing that the EU has 24 official languages. According to this regime, EU regulations and
other documents  of general  application must  be drafted in all  official  languages of  the EU
2
 Three contributions in this volume are enlightening in this respect: Chapters 3, 6 and 9 by Robertson, Kjær and
Strandvik, respectively. One may also profit from several recent publications by the DG for Translation (DGT) in the
series Studies on Translation and Multilingualism, in particular: Document quality control in public administrations
and international organisations (2013), Study on language and translation in international law and EU law  (2012),
Study on lawmaking in the EU multilingual environment (2010).
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 The linguistic regime of EU legislation was probably designed having in mind that the Treaty is binding on the
Member States, but the expectation mentioned above in the text is defensible in light of developments of the law
under the Treaty. See Case C-161/06, Skoma-Lux sro v Celní editelství Olomoucř , ECR 2007, I-10841.
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institutions.4 Granted, there are EU citizens who do not know any of the official languages in
which  EU  law  is  enacted,  just  like  there  are  Italian  citizens  who  are  unable  to  express
themselves in Italian or who cannot understand legislation written in Italian. To a certain extent,
therefore, the linguistic regime of the law is based on a normative presumption which does not
necessarily match the facts.5 When the tension between norm and facts becomes incompatible
with basic human rights standards, the law must accommodate more stringent linguistic regimes
tailored to the needs of the individual. In this case, it cannot resort to a fiction which presumes
that the EU official languages are understood by EU citizens or non-EU citizens residing in or
travelling in the EU. For this reason, Directive 2012/13/EU of 22 May 2012 on the right to
information in criminal proceedings provides suspects or accused persons with certain basic
information rights that must be guaranteed in criminal proceedings. Those rights include, among
others, the right to an interpreter or a translator – free of charge – to get access to essential
information concerning the proceedings in a language that he/she understands, and to enable
him/her  to  communicate  with a defence lawyer  (see Chapter  13 by Baj i  in  this volume).čć
Leaving this possibility aside, by opting for 24 official languages, the European Union intends
to make its law accessible on equal terms, at least in principle, in all official languages of the
Union, as mentioned above.
Nonetheless, by now it is clear that, in cases where the various language versions of the
Treaty or secondary legislation diverge, EU citizens have no right to rely on the provision in the
language they are consulting, which is usually the language (or one of the languages) of the
4
 According to Article 55(1) TEU, all language versions of the Treaty are authentic. The linguistic regime of EU
legislation is set out in Regulation No. 1 determining the languages to be used by the EEC (OJ L 17, 6.10.1958, at
385), as amended (see Art. 342 TFEU). Note, however, that not all the national official languages of the Member
States are EU official languages: Luxembourgish, an official language of Luxembourg since 1984, and Turkish, an
official language of Cyprus, are not official languages of the EU. 
5
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country of their nationality or residence. The CJEU has repeatedly denied such right in several
well-known cases (for details see Baaij 2012: 217–31). Given the initial premise, that is, the
equal authenticity of all language versions of instruments of EU law, this outcome is bound to
be controversial and difficult to reconcile with the principle of legal certainty (see Graziadei
2014; also Šar evi  2013: 4–11).č ć
Confronted with such case law (and the problems caused by the necessity to draft EU
legislation in  a  growing number  of  official  languages),  commentators  have addressed  these
sensitive  issues  and proposed reforms with  a  view to  providing  pragmatic  solutions  to  the
problems  confronting  national  courts  and  litigants  under  the  current  linguistic  regime  of
European law.6 While these proposals are being considered, the cultural presumptions about the
relationship between law and language undermined by the case law of the Court, and indeed by
the entire linguistic regime of EU law, should not go unnoticed. These presumptions are widely
shared  across  Europe,  either  consciously  or  unconsciously,  by  academics  and  the  legal
professions (as well as by members of the public). I will briefly address them in the following
paragraphs, challenging conventional wisdom by presenting each in the form of a question.
(Legal) Language: A Badge of Cultural Identity?
Today it would be foolish to argue that language is not a badge of cultural identity. The wealth
of evidence elevating this point almost to a self-evident truth is impressive. Since antiquity,
philosophers maintain that a distinctive trait of mankind is the ability to speak, thus establishing
our identity as human beings by the innate ability to communicate through speech. Linguists
6
 See,  for example,  Derlén (2011: 157),  who argues in favour of establishing French and English as mandatory
consultation  languages,  while  preserving  the  rule  of  the  equal  authenticity  of  all  the  language  versions  of  EU
legislation. A more radical solution is proposed by Schilling (2010: 64), who suggests that there be only one authentic
version of every EU enactment. This, however, would turn the clock back to the time in which a single language
(Latin) dominated the communicative aspects of the law. For an evaluation of these two proposals (and a third one),
see Šar evi  (2013: 17–25), who proposes concrete measures for improving the quality of EU multilingual legislationč ć
in an attempt to preserve the current linguistic regime. Other scholars acknowledge the need for reform but believe no
changes are imminent in the foreseeable future, for example, Bengoetxea (2011: 98–105).
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show that an individual reveals essential information about his/her culture and socio-economic
condition as soon as he/she begins to talk. Linguists and psychologists have debated whether
and how cultural and cognitive categories are encoded by languages affect the way people think,
suggesting that they think and behave differently depending on their language (Everett 2013:
255–72). Political scientists remind us that language policies adopted by States contribute to the
formation of a certain collective cultural identity. Lawyers as well may regard language as a
hallmark of cultural identity by drawing on a number of poignant observations from the field of
law.7
Granted,  language  is  now considered  a  badge  of  cultural  identity,  but  culture  and
cultural  identity  are  products  of  a  number  of  different  layers  or  components,  pointing  in
different directions. Culture is not a cage; cultural differentiation and cross-cultural interactions
have been the rule ever since the beginning of mankind. Culture changes over time under the
influence of projects for the future and evolving notions of community.  Mutatis mutandis, the
language of the law, a language developed for special purposes, is also a cultural expression
characterized by similar features.
For centuries the language of the law of the State in many continental countries was
mostly Latin, a language that was understood and used by lawyers, but not necessarily by their
clients. Along with Latin, Law French was one of the languages of the law in England, and
remained  so  long  after  Anglo-Norman  French  ceased  to  be  spoken  by  the  ruling  class  of
England.
7
 Unfortunately, lawyers may also accept this view when making language policy and deciding legal issues. Mertz
(1982)  shows how the US Supreme Court and other US courts endorsed a crude ‘folk’ version of the Whorfian
theory (by assuming that languages shape the range of conceptualization of their speakers) in the period between the
last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. According to Mertz, these courts held
that ‘U.S. political concepts were thought to be inextricably entwined with the English language; the concepts could
not be understood unless one spoke English’. The same author further notes: ‘[T]he appearance of a “Whorfian”
premise in this folk theory also lends support to the suggestion by cognitive anthropologists that scientific theories are
typically systematized adaptations of folk theories.’
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Even  today,  where  different  languages  are  spoken  by  the  population,  a  vehicular
language is  sometimes used  to  frame legislation  or  decide cases,  although the  language  in
question may be spoken or written only by a segment of the population. This may occur despite
constitutional  provisions  providing  for  the  equal  status  of  several  official  languages.8 As  a
vehicular  language,  that  language may have distinctive  features  which  distance it  from the
language spoken by native speakers.9
Multilateral  treaties  and conventions  are  written  in  a  limited  number  of  languages.
Access to the authentic texts of international norms created by agreement is the privilege of
those  who  know  those  languages  in  the  jurisdictions  where  such  norms  are  in  force.
Furthermore, even when the law is drafted in a language known by the people to whom it is
addressed, relevant texts of the law may refer to a foreign system of concepts and rules, or even
to a plurality of foreign systems of concepts and rules, without fully incorporating the system of
values and philosophical notions underlying them. Countries which at first changed their laws
by adopting local versions of foreign legal texts, such as Japan, are a telling testimony to this
possibility, although such reception results in a high degree of hybridization and complexity of
the language of the national law (Kitamura 1993). To a lesser extent, this is also true of the law
of  several  European  jurisdictions.  Over  the  centuries,  the  language  of  the  law  in  these
jurisdictions has been enriched by a variety of loanwords and adaptations across a large number
of legal fields, from commercial law to ecclesiastical law and constitutional law. In all contexts,
much give and take has occurred across the European space because the peoples of Europe have
shared broad socio-economic and cultural elements.10
8
 On the South African situation, see Harms (2012). 
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 See Chapter 8 by Felici in this volume; on the peculiar features of the CJEU’s ‘Court French’, see McAuliffe (2011:
97–115). 
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 In this sense one can speak of a common legal discourse without a common legal language; see Kjær (2004: 397).
Kjær develops her ideas in Chapter 6 of this volume where she recognizes the increasing use of EU legal English as a
lingua franca but views the development of a common legal discourse at EU level as the dominant factor making it
possible for EU concepts to be perceived as autonomous.
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When the CJEU rules against the language version of a provision consulted by one of
the litigants in favour of other language versions, which in its opinion spell out the applicable
rule, it reiterates the fundamental message that European law is enacted in different languages.
The fact that the Court upholds this approach reminds us that the relationship between cultural
identity, language and the law is more flexible than it is often considered to be, as I have argued.
Actually it is flexible to the point that, under certain circumstances, a citizen may not be able to
rely on the provision in question in the language he/she regularly consults. Furthermore, there
are also cases where litigants before the Court invoke the rule in a language version other than
their own.11 Flexible to what point, one may ask? The CJEU has held that an act adopted by an
EU institution cannot be enforced against natural and legal persons in a Member State before
they have the possibility to access the authentic text of the act in their own language in the
Official Journal.12 In operational terms, this is where the boundary is drawn.
The Message is in the Text: is it Really?
Learning to read, write and master a specialized language takes a great effort, and such abilities
are essential to survive as a lawyer in all modern jurisdictions. Law students spend most of their
time reading a variety of legal materials and learning to write legal texts for various purposes.
They learn the power of the spoken and written word as a tool to make the law. Sometimes they
have the opportunity to reflect on the failure of both as an effective means of changing the law.
11
 See, for example, Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank AG v Edgar Dietzinger Environment and consumers,
Case C-45/96 [1998] ECR I-1199. In this case, the Belgian, Finnish, French and German Governments, relying on the
English text of the relevant directive, argued that the guarantee obtained by the bank from a consumer was not a
contract  for  the purpose of  Directive 85/577 ‘because the guarantee is  not a  synallagmatic  contract –  namely a
bilateral agreement involving mutual and reciprocal obligations or duties – but a unilateral undertaking from the point
of view of the guarantor’ (Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 20 March 1997, Case C-45/96 [1998]
ECR I-1199, para.14, summarizing the submissions of the above-mentioned Governments). The UK Government, on
the other hand, did not argue that the guarantee was outside the scope of the Doorstep Selling Directive. 
12
 C-161/06  Skoma-Lux sro v Celní editelství  Olomoucř  [2007] ECR I-10841; see also Case C-345/06  Gottfried
Heinrich [2009] I-01659 (part of a regulation that has not been published cannot be enforced against an individual
who cannot, by the very nature of things, know what the regulation in question lays down).
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And  yet,  the  way  students  are  socialized  as  lawyers  leads  to  very  different  ways  of
understanding texts as sources of law, as does the practice of law itself.
One way to reflect on texts as sources of law is to look at them through the lens of the
conduit pipe metaphor, which represents language as a sort of universal conduit pipe, conveying
messages encoded in a particular language from speaker A to speaker B (see the seminal paper
by Reddy (1979)). Unfortunately, languages are a poor means of communication for the purpose
of establishing certain practices. Some messages would indeed be extremely difficult to grasp if
they were expressed only in words. In his short comic novel Portuguese Irregular Verbs (2003:
9), Alexander McCall Smith makes fun of two German professors of philology who are on a
tennis court for the first time and decide to play a game, using a tennis rule-book as their only
guide to learn the sport. The hilarious results show how language may completely fail to convey
a message explaining the organization of complex activities. It is arguable that the organization
of such complex tasks as those governed by a variety of normative texts – tasks much more
complex than playing tennis – cannot rely entirely on a message entrusted to verbal expression.
Indeed, language is often the second best option to provide information even with respect to
relatively simple matters such as getting directions. ‘Take the third turn on the right, and then
the fourth on the left’ is less clear than looking at a map!13 Nonetheless, ‘as soon as speech, and
the use of signs are introduced into any action, the action becomes transformed and organised
along entirely new lines’ (Vygotsky 1978: 24).14
On the other hand, lawyers know (although they may be reluctant to admit it!) that
verbal propositions framing normative texts provide at best a linguistic cue to understanding the
law  as  a  form  of  practice.  Read  the  text  of  any  constitution  and  you  will  still  not  be  a
constitutional lawyer.  Normative texts generally regulate only some aspects of a rule-bound
13
 Citing this example to illustrate the difficulty of using abstract terms of a language to give directions, Aitchison
(1997: 23) concludes that the conduit pipe metaphor of language is misleading.
14
 Sacco’s work (1991) on cryptotypes and formants shows how similar insights are fundamental to understanding the
relationship between law, language and action; see also Sacco (1995).
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practice. They focus on what is salient or patently needs to be settled and can ignore the rest.
What remains implicit, nonetheless, may be just as relevant. Comparative lawyers have noticed
this, and speak of cryptotypes to refer to tacit knowledge that influences how the law is applied
(Sacco 1991:  343,  385;  cf.  Grossfeld  and Eberle  2003).  Lawyers  are  also  confronted  with
misleading normative texts either because they reflect obsolete norms or provide dysfunctional
legal regimes which gain little to no support in practice. In medieval England, claimants suing
for trespass had to allege that they had been the victim of an injury caused by the defendant vi et
armis. But quite often this was a fiction: no violence or weapons were necessary for realization
of the tort.15 Legal texts are recorded in linguistic signs standing for concepts and expressing
rules  that  evolve  and  change  over  time  through  usage  by  professionals  and  lay  persons.
Unstructured concepts such as  good faith are just the tip of the iceberg of a whole world of
indeterminate linguistic signs.
The CJEU has rejected the literal approach to interpretation in a wide range of cases,
holding that the wording alone often provides little guidance for ascertaining the meaning of the
law. In light of the Court’s preference for the teleological method of interpretation, it is fair to
ask whether it is really worth making the effort to compare the various language versions of EU
legislation, given that a functional approach to ascribing meaning to EU texts often prevails (cf.
Derlén 2011: 156).
A step in the right direction is to openly acknowledge that EU legislation often contains
linguistic signs with no established meaning. Their meaning is created and exists thanks to the
activity of lawyers, scholars and judges who compare the different language versions of EU
legislation, reflect on the purpose of the enactment, draw from their knowledge of the law, and
15
 This is not a recent development in the law: Anon. (1304) Y.B. 32 & 33 Edw I, Roll Series, 259, reproduced in
Baker and Milsom (1986: 297) . It is not by chance because, as Milsom (1981: xi) noted, ‘The life of the common law
has been in the unceasing abuse of its elementary ideas.’  Of course,  the same observation holds for other legal
systems as well.
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collectively  take a  decision  on which  norms must  be enforced,  thus  making European law
evolve in a more or less uniform direction.
Considered from this perspective, the texts of European provisions are nothing but a
focal  point  for the practice of creating norms,  a support  prompting individuals to work out
meaning  which  was  not  there  from  the  very  beginning.16 The  structure  of  these  practices
determines the meaning eventually ascribed to the text.
This last point helps to clarify how it can happen that a certain provision produces the
same regulatory effect, although the provision in question is drafted without using harmonized
terminology and defining key concepts. A good example in this respect is provided by Directive
2002/47/EC of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements. The title and the text of this
Directive in English studiously avoid reference to the notion of ‘contract’, with the exception of
a single sentence in the entire text. On the other hand, the French and Italian versions of the
Directive  speak  respectively  of  contrats  de  garantie  financière and  contratti  di  garanzia
finanziaria to convey what the English version of the Directive calls  collateral arrangements.
The  German  version  of  the  same  Directive  uses  the  term  Finanzsicherheiten,  while  other
versions  of  the  same  provisions,  such  as  the  Spanish,  favour  agreements  (acuerdos)  over
financial guarantees. One could hardly think of more variations to designate the same concept.
And yet, when consulting the various language versions of the Directive on this point, we find
rules  on  the  same  type  of  transactions.17 The  subject  is  the  same because  the  transactions
covered by the Directive correspond to the same set  of  financial  transactions  structured by
model master agreements drafted by major global market players.18 On the other hand, other
aspects  of  that  instrument,  such  as  reference  to  the  notion  of  ‘reasonableness’,  are  not
16
 For a fundamental contribution on this aspect from the perspective of legal theory, see Kennedy (1998).
17
 One would be tempted to add that, despite all its variations, the facts to which the story refers are still the same, as
in Raymond Queneau’s Exercices de style.
18
 See Riles (2011) for a closer look at the practice generated by these agreements in different places,. 
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harmonized and will thus be interpreted in accordance with the national laws of the Member
States (Graziadei 2012).
A Change in Language is a Change in the Law?
Lawyers  have  many  preconceptions  about  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  law  and
language. Among them is the idea that law is inextricably linked to the language in which it is
expressed. Of course, natural languages are different. Even a modest exercise in legal drafting
such as  consolidating the consumer  acquis in  English  for  a  European-wide  audience  poses
problems as to what kind of language should be used for this purpose (Dannemann et al. 2007).
And yet, the idea that different languages cannot express the same law is not warranted by the
general observation that languages are different and that they possess different phonological,
graphological, morphological, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic and stylistic structures, as well as
socio-cultural backgrounds.19 As has been rightly noted, this is just the beginning of the story
(see Sin 2013: 929–51).
Multilingual uniform legislation could be adduced as prima facie evidence against the
idea that it is impossible to express the same law in a plurality of languages, were it not for the
circumstance that, contrary to the purpose of such legislation to unify the law across national
boundaries, there is a good chance that it will lead to divergent decisions by the national courts
of the States where it is in force. It is therefore tempting to analyse the failures of multilingual
uniform legislation as compelling evidence of the fact that different language versions of the
same rule produce conflicting meanings of the (uniform) enactment. Divergent interpretations
of  uniform texts  would  thus  prove  that  each  language  is  bound  to  communicate  different
meanings, even though the purpose and will is to adopt a common set of rules. As the argument
goes, each language ultimately carves up the world in its own way.
Without taking issue with this last general assumption, which was the subject of lively
debate among linguists and psychologists in the twentieth century, this is an unsatisfactory way
19
 I share the observations by Pozzo, in Chapter 5 of this volume, on the relationship between language, culture and
the law.
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to  conceptualize the relationship between the law and its  linguistic  formulation(s).  Uniform
legislation produces divergent interpretations when the languages in which it enters into force
do not denote the same concepts and express the same rules across national boundaries. Hence,
divergent interpretations of uniform legislation do not occur simply because languages have a
particular genius of their own, but because of the lack of uniformity at the conceptual level. In
other words, the linguistic signs in the different authentic language versions do not always have
the same referential  meaning. Like legal  translations lacking such basis,  uniform legislation
without a uniform referential system is also bound to fail.20
Accordingly, the problematic record of uniform multilingual legislation is not due to the
nature  of  the  tool  employed  to  achieve  the  intended  result,  that  is,  sets  of  linguistic  signs
belonging to certain natural languages, but to the failure to use that tool to achieve the same
referential meaning, for semantic21 and syntactic reasons.22
A change in the language used to frame the law does not per se entail a change in the
law; it does only when it involves a change in the referential system. For example, when France
abandoned Latin in favour of French to draft its civil code, the change in the linguistic signs
used to express the law did not change their referents at first. To take a vivid example of this
dynamic and its limited consequences, the term faute mentioned in Art. 1382 Code civil has the
peculiar meaning(s) highlighted in numerous comparative works,23 not because it is somehow
very French, but because it mirrors the (complex) meaning of the Latin term culpa in the ius
20
 In  her  fundamental  contribution  Šar evi  (1997)  shows  that  the  lack  of  harmonization  in  multilingual  EUč ć
terminology can be identified as a problem of conceptual discrepancy and must be tackled as such. In the field of
computer science and jurisprudence, Sartor et al. (2011) address this problem from the perspective of the different
legal ontologies underlying each legal system. 
21
 Think of the possibility of ending up with a translation which does not recognize a foreign term as a false friend:
Ferreri (2010); Honnold (1988: 208) warns in general terms against the ‘natural tendency to read the international text
through the lenses of domestic law’.
22
 On this point see Chapter 7 by Baaij in this volume; see also Visconti (2010: 29 ff.)
23
 See, for example, Markesinis and Lawson (1982:185 ff.).
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commune, which was eventually rendered in French by the term  faute  (see Graziadei 2010:
126). The law did not change at first simply because a new linguistic sign was introduced; the
sign was attributed the same semantic value as culpa.
German legal scholars followed a different strategy when they began to draft the law in
German. Their commentaries introduced not only a new set of linguistic signs to express the
law, but also new referents to sharpen the conceptual system of the law. This was a reaction to
what they perceived as an overly unstructured approach to delictual liability. Confronted with
the old notion of  culpa,  nineteenth-century German scholars systematically distinguished its
various meanings, linking each of them to a different German linguistic sign. Placing greater
emphasis on differentiating negligent and intentional wrongdoing, they distinguished these two
elements from the objective element of wrongfulness. Eventually § 823 of the German BGB
codified  all  these  distinctions,  thereby  setting  new  boundaries  to  delictual  liability.  The
languages  of  the  law in  Germany  and  France  could  begin  to  converge  once  more  if  both
countries would opt for a new common terminology, or if the French would accommodate their
language to make room to express more consistently the distinctions of delictual liability known
in Germany.24
The  failure  to  distinguish  between  the  different  layers  of  language  and  law  when
framing the same law in different languages may lead to major errors of perspective.
One of these is the belief that the more distant two languages are from the linguistic
point of view, the more difficult it is to render the concepts and the rules of one legal system in
the language of the other system. This is not necessarily true if the two languages in question
share the same referential system.
For example,  when the Hong Kong ordinances were first  translated into Chinese in
preparation for the return of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China in 1997, a whole
new vocabulary had to be created to express the common law concepts in Chinese. Since the
24
 On the possibility of moving in this direction, see Borghetti (2008). On the development of French and German as
languages of the law, see Šar evi  (1997: 29–53). č ć
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new terms were assigned a common law meaning, the Chinese texts derive their meaning from
the  English  source  texts,  not  from  Chinese  law.  As  a  result,  the  Chinese  expression  for
merchantable quality derives its meaning from the common law concept in the Hong Kong Sale
of Goods Act, which, in turn, is modelled on the English Sale of Goods Act (on this point Sin
2013: 939–40; see also Šar evi  1997: 274–5).č ć
The  process  of  creating  terms  (signs)  to  designate  uniform  concepts  in  different
languages requires considerable skill and expertise (however, the same applies to other aspects
of  the  language  as  well).25 When  choosing  terms  to  designate  new  concepts  or  objects
(referents) one can either create a new term (neologism) or assign a new meaning to an existing
word or phrase. A general feature of word formation is the tendency to use an existing sign to
denote a new referent.26 Different languages, however, may choose different words to denote the
same object or referent, depending on how the new association between the sign and referent or
object is established. For example, when glasses27 were invented in Europe, they were called
occhiali in Italian,  lunettes  in French, gafas  in Spanish and  Brille  in German. Each of these
words evokes a different association linked to the same object.  The German word is derived
from the name of the crystal that was originally used to make lenses. The French word refers to
the shape of glasses, lunette being a diminutive of the word lune (moon). In Spanish the name is
taken from the curved stem that bends behind the ear to hold the lenses in place in front of the
eyes. The Italian name for glasses is derived from occhi, the word for eyes. The English word
was initially associated with the idea of glasses for the eyes (eye-glasses).
When using a term, the associations or connotations it evokes in a particular language
should always be taken into account. In the field of law it is particularly important to avoid
choosing terms which could evoke connotations having unwanted or negative implications for
25
 On this point see Chapter 11 by Šar evi  and Chapter 12 by Bratani  and Lon ar in this volume.č ć ć č
26
 See,  for example,  the example provided by Case 533/07,  Falco Privatstiftung and Thomas Rabitsch v Gisela
Weller-Lindhorst [2009] ECR I-03327, discussed by Ioriatti Ferrari (2010: 320, note 28). 
27
 This example is cited in Alinei (2009: 77-78).
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the development of the law. A lawyer, for example, should not translate  soviet with  council
because of the political connotations of the first word.28
Drafters  of  multilingual  legal  instruments,  interpreters and translators  are constantly
confronted with the problem of finding words which are sufficiently neutral so as to avoid
unwanted meanings or  connotational  baggage (see Dannemann 2012:  96–9).  EU legislation
cannot have uniform effects nor can harmonization of national laws be achieved, unless EU
multilingual  lawmaking  is  accompanied  by  the  development  of  a  common set  of  concepts
shared by all those involved in its application.
The CJEU is one of the principal  agents  advancing the quest  for a common set  of
concepts. The Court’s decisions disavowing the authority of one or more language versions of a
EU normative text are motivated by the necessity to uphold the unity of European law. Such
unity cannot be secured if the different language versions of EU legislation are interpreted and
applied  differently  in  the  Member  States.  However,  the  CJEU’s  insistence  on  developing
autonomous  EU legal  concepts  also  shows  that  determining  which  concepts  constitute  the
essential building blocks of European law is a problem that can also surface within the semantic
field of a single language (see Chapters 6 and 10 in this volume by Kjær and Engberg). For this
reason linguistic evidence does not per se determine the meaning to be assigned to a particular
EU legal provision.
Conclusions
Recent  scholarly research in  law has  repeatedly addressed the theme of  the birth  of a new
European legal culture which is gradually developing in a variety of ways at multiple sites. All
too often the missing piece in the story is how to build this new legal culture on the multilingual
foundations provided by the present linguistic regime of the European Union.
This chapter makes the point that any contribution on law and culture which ignores the
multilingual foundations of European law fails to recognize a fundamental aspect of the law in
28
 This example is from Sacco (1992)..
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Europe today.29 Every text enacted by the EU institutions raises the question of how it will be
interpreted and applied across national boundaries. Multilingual legislation in Europe cannot
produce uniform legal change or legal harmonization across Europe, unless all those responsible
for achieving its uniform application share a common understanding of EU legislation. Lack of
coherence in the application of European law is very often due to the fact that EU enactments
cannot rely on a uniform set of concepts shared across the European space. The work towards
building  uniform concepts  is  ongoing.  Furthermore,  the  framing  of  multilingual  legislation
requires a more general ability to explore the effects that linguistic signs will have in practice
when used to express European law. This requires carrying out linguistic and legal comparisons
which  are  essential  for  the  development  of  legal  translation  studies  and  for  intercultural
communication in multilingual Europe.
I began this chapter by insisting on the necessity to focus less on the normative virtues
of texts as such, and more on the normative forces grounding the practice of law in Europe. I
maintain my premise, however, my conclusion ends on a different note. The birth of a new legal
culture in multilingual Europe will be the product of a new awareness of the various ways and
means available to a multilingual lawmaker, as well as of the sophisticated linguistic needs that
must be satisfied to make the law a credible communicative act.
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